

Stella Sandford

What is Maternal Labour?

What happens when we attempt to draw together the concepts of ‘the maternal’ and ‘labour’ in the category of ‘maternal labour’?ⁱ What is the specificity of maternal labour as *labour* and what is its specificity as *maternal*? My thesis in this paper is that there is a peculiar difficulty in the category of ‘maternal labour’, even a fundamental contradiction. However, rather than seeing this contradiction as a reason for rejecting the category, I will try instead to think through its significance. To this end I will begin with a brief discussion of Marx’s comments, in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse*, on the category of labour; I will consider some classic Marxist feminist literature from the 1970s and 1980s on the relation between Marxism and feminism and on the domestic labour debates; and, finally, I will try to explain the nature of the contradiction posed by ‘maternal labour’, and its significance.

But first, what reason is there to think that there is a peculiar difficulty with the category of ‘maternal labour’? Granted that Marx was not the first to deploy the concept of labour (*die Arbeit*), analyses of the role of labour in relation to capital, as well as labour relations, and forms of labour, nonetheless lean on a broadly Marxist inheritance. In critical social and political analysis ‘labour’ is a term that makes sense in its relation to various other terms such as production, capital, value, and commodity that taken together comprise the categories of Marxist discourse. This then is the theoretical context of the category of labour – the broad theoretical field of its intelligibility and of its explanatory or critical force. It is this category of ‘labour’ – still the most developed category that we have – that is presumed in the attempt to think maternal labour (as well as other forms of care labour) precisely *as* labour rather than as, for example, instinctual impulse or non-work.

However, the concept of ‘the maternal’ is, emphatically, not a category of Marxist discourse, and neither, of course, is the concept of ‘care’. No doubt these *can* be reduced to empirically determined qualifiers of the Marxist category of labour – examples, that is, of kinds of labour the Marxist category describes – but as objects of interest in their own right they exceed this reduction and may indeed function as a form of critique in relation to certain uses of the category of labour, amongst others. What then is the theoretical context of the concept of ‘the maternal’, specifically? Let us say it is the double context of feminist theory and psychology under its broadest definition, including psychoanalytical theory and

psychosocial studies, with a pronounced philosophical inflection visible in the conjunction ‘the maternal’ – the definite article signaling that we are dealing with something that claims our interest in its own right, rather than as an aspect or property of another thing. And in this I presume that the concept of ‘the maternal’ such as it has been recently developed,ⁱⁱ refers to more than biological motherhood; that the idea of ‘the maternal’ poses itself as a problem, rather than being taken for granted as talk of a natural phenomenon.ⁱⁱⁱ

The discourse of Marxist economic analysis (from which we take the category of labour) and the discourses of feminism and feminist theory (in which we partly locate the concept of the maternal) have always been in some respects antagonistic. By the late 1960s, at least, and into the 1970s feminists struggled to explain the specificity of women’s oppression with Marxist categories, worried that an analysis restricted to Marxist categories might not be able to recognise the phenomenon of women’s oppression as requiring an analysis separate from an economic or class analysis and needing a revolutionary praxis of its own. For some, gender-blind Marxist categories were unfit for an adequate class analysis too, requiring an account of the gendered division of labour as an essential aspect of all class analysis, not just of relations between men and women.^{iv} Marxist feminist critics of non-Marxist feminist theories of women’s oppression insisted on the need for a *materialist* analysis of women’s oppression. Materialist analysis was usually only specified in opposition to another kind of analysis: we need materialist analysis *rather than* psychological analysis, for instance; analysis of the material base, not of the ideological superstructure and its psychological effects on or in individuals.^v In this context, then, the concept of ‘the maternal’ is doubly opposed to Marxist discourse, being derived from two discourses seemingly opposed to it – non-Marxist feminist theory and psychology, very broadly understood. We cannot therefore simply juxtapose them in the phrase ‘maternal labour’ and assume the legitimacy of the construction. To pose the problem in its most extreme form, then: how can the concept of the maternal circulate alongside the category of labour as anything other than an abjected, psychologistic and therefore idealist theoretical deviance? What possible relation can the concept of the maternal have to that of labour given the absence of a shared theoretical context? What category of labour can bear the association with the maternal in the phrase ‘maternal labour’ without swallowing it up? What is the specificity of ‘maternal labour’? And what would an adequate understanding of ‘maternal labour’ mean for our understanding of labour and the maternal themselves?^{vi}

Stella Sandford, What is Maternal Labour?

Studies in the Maternal, 3(2), 2011, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk

Labour, production and domestic labour

Let us return to the category of labour itself. Marx's few pages on this in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse* explain how a category that refers to something 'immeasurably old' may nevertheless be understood to be a modern category. When we think of labour in general or labour as such, we think of something that characterizes the activity of human beings in all epochs. That is, we think not only of something that, to speak crudely, all human beings have always done in one way or another. We also speak of something that analysts in previous epochs have always known that human beings have always done in one way or another – they may even have used the word 'labour' to describe it. But at the moment at which economic analysis tears itself away from a preoccupation with a particular form of labour – agricultural, manufacturing or commercial, for example – as the basis of the creation of wealth, to arrive at the abstraction of 'labour in general', a decisive step is taken. This is more than the discovery of the 'abstract expression for the simplest and most ancient relation in which human beings – in whatever form of society – play the role of producers', although of course it is also that. It is the positive conception of labour in general as indifferent to any specific kind of labour, and such a conception, Marx writes, 'corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference'.^{vii} It is at this point that labour 'in reality', and not just in the concept, has

ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form... Here, then, for the first time, the point of departure of modern economics, namely the abstraction of the category 'labour', 'labour as such', labour pure and simple, becomes true in practice. The simplest abstraction, then, which modern economics places at the head of its discussions, and which expresses an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all forms of society, nevertheless achieves practical truth as an abstraction only as a category of the most modern society.^{viii}

This is an example of a more general point, for Marx. The point is that 'even the most abstract categories, despite their validity – precisely because of their abstractness – for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only for and within those relations.'^{ix} That is, the abstract category of labour refers to – is valid for – all epochs: this is precisely the nature of its being-abstract. But this being-abstract, this being-valid of the category for all epochs, is a product of a particular epoch, of particular historic relations, i.e. capitalist relations, and it achieves its fullest validity ('achieves practical truth') as a category of

Stella Sandford, What is Maternal Labour?

Studies in the Maternal, 3(2), 2011, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk

analysis in or for that particular epoch or in or for those particular historic relations. Abstractly, or ‘in general’, we can speak of labour in all epochs, because ‘abstract labour’ is a specific category of the analysis of capitalism arising from the concrete development of the buying and selling of transferable labour power. The point, most simply put, is that the abstract category is valid *for* all epochs but it only arises *as* valid for all epochs under the specific conditions of capitalism in which it is realised in a general form. I have dwelt on this more general point about abstract categories in order that, later, we may consider it again in relation to the category of ‘the maternal’.

Marx’s comments on the category of labour in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse* occur a few pages after an argument for the validity of the *category* of production in general as a rational abstraction, when there is no such *thing* as production in general. That is, we may speak of ‘production’ in general – specifically we may speak of ‘production’ as the necessary starting point for economic analysis – to the extent that this ‘brings out and fixes the common element’ of all production, in all historical epochs, even though production *is* always ‘production at a definite stage of social development – production by social individuals.’^x Everyone produces and there are general features of production but no one produces in general. The argument that production is the necessary starting point for economic analysis includes the claim that consumption, distribution, exchange and reproduction are moments of production itself – not identical with it but parts of a processual totality in which production predominates because ‘the process always returns to production to begin anew.’^{xi} Now, the question for feminists is not just whether or how women’s work in the home and their part in the processes of biological and social-familial reproduction – child-bearing and child-rearing – can be properly understood within this ‘productivist paradigm’, but also whether and how the categories of Marxist analysis allow us to account for the general fact and the specific forms of the *oppression* of women by men.

From amongst the huge literature on Marxism and feminism, let us look at some of the arguments in one, now canonical collection of essays, edited by Lydia Sargent, *Women and Revolution. The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: A Debate on Class and Patriarchy* (1981). There is no doubt that these essays are in some ways dated, not only by their unembarrassed use of classical Marxist terminology but by their assumption (true at the time) about the number of women working only in the home, which is connected to a dated terminology, that of the ‘housewife’, for example. However, they provide us with valuable food for thought, both in respect of their theoretical insights and what they unwittingly reveal.

Stella Sandford, What is Maternal Labour?

Studies in the Maternal, 3(2), 2011, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk

In many of these essays the question of ‘domestic labour’ is central. This was the result of the commitment to materialist analysis, or in another terminology to the analysis of something objective (the fact and specific character of women’s domestic work) rather than something subjective: women’s lived experience of oppression, sexism, and so on, which was too easily interpreted as the individualistic, bourgeois feminism of complaint.^{xiii} To use the terminology employed in *Women and Revolution*, if the Marxist analysis of capitalism classically rests on the claim that capital extracts surplus value from the labour of the working class (which is the mechanism of their being oppressed), and if labour is therefore understood in terms of the production of exchange value – where productive labour is given analytic priority over unproductive labour – where does domestic labour fit in? Is it productive or unproductive? Does the role of unproductive labour need to be reassessed? Is it part of a separate system of patriarchy, in cahoots with capitalism, or is it fully integrated into, or even the material basis for, the capitalist system of production? How exactly do social and biological reproduction fit into this ‘productivist’ paradigm?

Some attempts were made to expand the Marxist analysis to include domestic labour. Margaret Benston, for example, argued that women’s unpaid domestic labour – cooking, sewing, cleaning, caring for children, and so on – produces use values (products and services) that are consumed directly in the home. Insisting on the production of use value by women’s domestic labour, Benston argued that ‘the family should be seen primarily as a production unit for housework and child-rearing.’^{xiii} Peggy Morton saw the family as, more precisely, the economic unit whose function was the maintenance and reproduction of labour power. As such, women worked in the home for capital (as Eli Zaretsky had earlier argued).^{xiv} Variants of this argument, including the argument that domestic labour produced surplus value, were the basis for the Wages for Housework Campaign, but for many feminists this kind of Marxist analysis simply failed to explain anything about the oppression of women as women – that is, it was an analysis of capitalism that slotted in women’s domestic labour but failed to explain patriarchy, a term that had gained currency in the radical feminism of roughly the same period. Heidi Hartmann, for one, attempted to remedy this, understanding patriarchy as a social and economic as well as a psychic structure, a structure (like capitalism) with a material base, in this case men’s control over (and appropriation of) women’s labour power: a system of oppression different to the system of capitalism but which supported it.^{xv} Domestic labour produces use values, but this production is denigrated and the denigration of this production ‘obscures capital’s inability to meet socially determined needs at the same time

Stella Sandford, *What is Maternal Labour?*

Studies in the Maternal, 3(2), 2011, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk

that it degrades women in the eyes of men, providing a rationale for male dominance.’ The low-paid and low status ‘nurturant roles’ (teacher, welfare worker, care worker) that women tend to occupy in paid employment outside the home are similarly denigrated because women perform them, and thus ‘the confrontation of capital’s priority on exchange value [with] a demand for use values can be avoided.’^{xvi} Privileging the category of division of labour over that of class, Iris Young argued that the ‘gender division of labour’ is the first division of labour out of which class society emerges, that capitalism is *founded on* gender hierarchy and that ‘marginalization of women and thereby our functioning as a secondary labour force is an essential and fundamental characteristic of capitalism.’^{xvii}

Capitalist subject/maternal subject

Three features of these analyses are immediately striking. First, these analyses basically accept the category of production as their starting point, with labour as the activity of production, even as they decry the limitations of the productivist paradigm. Young, for example, sees no reason why the ‘category of production or labour [sic]’ should not include ‘traditional women’s tasks as bearing and rearing children, caring for the sick, cleaning, cooking, etc’, quite as much as ‘the making of objects in a factory.’^{xviii} And while this leads to formulations which are, in some respects, jarring today – for example the formulation of the family as a production unit for housework and child-rearing – they are formulations which describe the function of the family *from the standpoint of capital* and as such have some truth.

Second, it is striking that the broad category of ‘domestic labour’ not only covers such widely differing activities as ‘bearing and rearing children, caring for the sick, cleaning, cooking, etc’ but also sets them on a plane of equivalence. Bearing and rearing children is like – it is the same kind of labour as – cooking and cleaning. Now obviously rearing children involves caring for the sick (sometimes), cleaning and cooking (a lot of the time), but it is not qualitatively identical with these tasks and involves, in particular, an affective, invested, intersubjective and ethical dimension that, say, cleaning does not. Again, of course, people *can* be invested in cleaning, but it seems to me that being responsible for the care of human infants and children is not the same as being responsible for keeping the kitchen clean; not least, the stakes – the consequence of failure – are much higher.^{xix}

This means that maternal labour is not easily subsumed under the category of domestic labour, but where it is so subsumed, as in the analyses I have been discussing, where the bearing and rearing of children *is* treated as equivalent to cooking and cleaning, there is

Stella Sandford, What is Maternal Labour?

Studies in the Maternal, 3(2), 2011, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk

one radical, albeit implicit, result: in casting what we might call ‘maternal labour’ (all aspects of rearing children) precisely *as* labour and as equivalent to other forms of domestic labour it constructs maternal labour – just like cleaning and cooking – as socially necessary labour *delegated to* women, rather than as a natural function *of* women which, under certain conditions, can be delegated to others.^{xx} Further, the idea of maternal labour as delegated to women requires us to rethink the idea of delegation itself to the extent that this latter usually presupposes an individual delegating agent to whom the delegated power, responsibility, duty, and so on, properly belongs. On this model all labour is, on the contrary, originally socially delegated to persons, not delegated from a natural origin.

Third, and as a result of an analysis of domestic labour that arises from the standpoint of capital, what we may, from another standpoint, think of as the specific *quality* of ‘maternal labour’ – what in fact makes maternal labour different to cooking and cleaning – is so radically absent that, from the vantage point of the present, we may even suspect a repression. Granted, we may say, that this is how things appear from the standpoint of capital,^{xxi} but how do they appear from the standpoint of the mother? Does her care of the neonate appear to her as the production of a use value that the baby consumes? To put this in another way, the analyses of domestic labour, including the maternal labour of bearing and rearing children, describe the mother qua capitalist subject. But is it possible to locate a maternal subject who is not completely subsumed within their role in capitalism? And are these – the capitalist subject and the maternal subject – incommensurable figures from separate and competing theoretical spheres?^{xxii}

I have indicated that one of the deficits in the accounts of maternal labour as domestic labour concerns the absence of any consideration of the affective dimension of maternal labour. In fact, Ann Ferguson and Nancy Folbre coined the phrase ‘sex-affective production’ to describe ‘child-bearing, child-rearing, and the provision of nurturance, affection, and sexual satisfaction’ precisely because they saw that the specific nature of what they call ‘the labor that mothers and wives perform’ was lost in the general category of domestic labour and its orthodox Marxist feminist analysis.^{xxiii} But then their argument is that these aspects of maternal labour (not a phrase they themselves use) are misunderstood because they are relegated to the realm of psychology, ideology or culture. Instead they argue that their character as labour – and therefore as economic activity – must be emphasised hence the phrase ‘sex-affective *production*’. As production is ‘purposeful human behavior which creates use values’ we can now see, Ferguson and Folbre claim, that ‘the bearing and

rearing of children, and the provision of affection, nurturance, and sexual satisfaction, all represent social use values.^{xxxiv} The social organization of child rearing, in particular, involves the delegation of this particular form of labour to women, which reproduces a particular social definition of motherhood. All this is true, of course. But the question remains, is it possible to think a not-wholly capitalist maternal subject without confining ourselves to the sphere of psychology? Is it possible to think the affective dimensions of maternal labour in general without evoking the sphere of merely subjective, individual feeling?

It might seem as though the category of ‘affective labour’ in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s *Empire* and *Commonwealth* could be of help here – in fact it cannot. For Hardt and Negri ‘affective labour’ is one aspect of the broader category of immaterial labour, ‘labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge or communication.’^{xxxv} According to Hardt and Negri, although the ‘*affective labor* of human contact and interaction’ is ‘immersed in the corporeal, the somatic [...] the affects it produces are nonetheless immaterial. What affective labor produces are social networks, forms of community, biopower.’^{xxxvi} Leaving to one side for the moment that this presumes a pre-Marxist understanding of materiality, and that this is a careless use of Hardt and Negri’s own concept of biopower, which is elsewhere identified with affective labour (not said to be its product),^{xxxvii} we can take the point that affective labour or biopower ‘becomes an agent of production when the entire context of reproduction is subsumed under capitalist rule, that is, when reproduction and the vital relationships that constitute it themselves become directly productive.’^{xxxviii} This is the real subsumption of society (not just labour) under capital, where both society and capital are ‘synonymous with the globalized productive order.’

In *Commonwealth* Hardt and Negri push this analysis further. There they argue that ‘affective, emotional, and relationship tasks, are becoming increasingly central in all sectors of labor’, as the traditional distinction between production and reproduction breaks down – as production becomes, primarily, the (re)production of social relationships and forms of life.^{xxxix} However, acknowledging that affective labour is disproportionately required of women, ‘on and off the job’, Hardt and Negri nevertheless retain a distinction between affective labour proper and ‘unpaid domestic and reproductive labour, such as housework and childcare.’^{xxx} Examples of affective labour in *Empire* include health services, the entertainment industry and “‘in-person services’”,^{xxxi} bringing ‘care’ into the sphere of capitalist production in care homes, private health care and also caring for the customer.^{xxxii} This would also include, one presumes, childcare services – nannies, childminders and private daycare centres. Despite the

claims, then, about the ‘increasingly blurred boundaries between labor and life, and between production and reproduction’ (the ‘becoming biopolitical’ of labour) and indeed despite the claims about the real subsumption of society under capital, maternal labour – the rearing of children – has somehow escaped the analysis, relegated, by omission, to precisely that hinterland of unproductive domesticity, outside of economic-social analysis, from which feminists have been trying to rescue it for half a century at least.

Living the contradiction

The problem, then, is this: when we try to think maternal labour as labour, under the general category of labour, which, as Marx says, ‘corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference’, we lose what is specific in maternal labour, which is precisely *not* a matter of indifference to the individual who labours. This suggests that the category of labour cannot bear the association with the maternal without swallowing it up. On the other hand, when we try to insist on what is specific to the maternal in the idea of maternal labour, on what is *not* a matter of indifference, it loses its character as labour, as able to be thought as part of the social-political whole, which is arguably what happens in Sara Ruddick’s *Maternal Thinking*, for example, where the compelling account of the labour of ‘mothering’ and ‘maternal thinking’ and the argument for the epistemological value and moral superiority of its standpoint can, in the end, offer no more than a hopeful ‘vision’ for a politics of peace.^{xxxiii}

Thus the category of ‘maternal labour’ is, fundamentally, contradictory. This does not mean, however, that we should reject it as mistaken or unintelligible. For the contradiction in the category reflects a contradiction in reality: the contradiction between the demands of capitalist production, according to which all aspects of existence must accommodate themselves to the form of the market, and the aspects – or remnants, as Adorno might say – of the subject’s resistance to this. Indeed, this is what some feminists in the 1970s identified as the conflict between the demand for the production of use value for consumption and the demand for the production of value for exchange, that was developed in the work of Harding, Ruddick and others. Thus, ultimately, the contradiction between the capitalist subject and the maternal subject is not a contradiction arising from incompatible discourses, but a lived contradiction. And while this contradiction might become most visibly acute in

Stella Sandford, What is Maternal Labour?

Studies in the Maternal, 3(2), 2011, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk

the category of maternal labour – which is the virtue of the category – it is surely also characteristic of all care labour, paid and unpaid.

I would like to end with a question about the concept of the maternal itself. Is this an abstract category that – like the category of labour in general – is retrospectively (*nachträglich*) valid for all epochs even though it is distinctively modern? And if so, what are the historical conditions of its emergence? These are the questions that we need to ask now, if we are to fully understand the meaning and significance of the concept of ‘the maternal’.

ⁱ This paper, presented here in a slightly revised form, was written for the MaMSIE study day on ‘Motherhood, Servitude and the Delegation of Care’, 20.05.11, at Birkbeck College, University of London. I am grateful to the organizers of the study day, especially Lisa Baraitser, for the opportunity to think about maternal labour, which led to this paper.

ⁱⁱ Notably in Lisa Baraitser, *Maternal Encounters: The Ethics of Interruption* (London: Routledge, 2009). See, in particular, p. 19. Baraitser partly draws (though not uncritically) on Sara Ruddick here. See Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1989), pp. 17, 41.

ⁱⁱⁱ I refer to the *category* of labour and the *concept* of the maternal because the former is a basic and constitutive element in Marxist discourse whereas the latter is, as yet, a mere abstraction – a description which is not, however, to be taken as a criticism of it.

^{iv} See, for example, Iris Young, ‘Beyond the Unhappy Marriage: A Critique of the Dual Systems Theory’, in Lydia Sargent, ed., *Women and Revolution: The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism – A Debate on Class and Patriarchy* (London: Pluto, 1981), especially pp. 50–56.

^v For example, Iris Young characterizes Juliet Mitchell’s approach in *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* as non-materialist, a version of ‘the radical feminist concept of patriarchy as an ideological and psychological structure... [Mitchell] takes patriarchy as a universal and formal ideological structure ... [an] ideological and psychological structure lying outside economic relations’. Young, ‘Beyond the Unhappy Marriage: A Critique of the Dual Systems Theory’, in Sargent, ed., *Women and Revolution*, pp. 45–6. However, Sandra Harding’s contribution to *Women and Revolution* (‘What is the Real Material Base of Patriarchy and Capital?’) avoids the opposition between materialist and psychological analysis with an argument for the necessity of thinking the material conditions of the production of ‘such distinctive historical persons as men, women, capitalists, workers, heterosexuals and homosexuals, racists and their victims’ in the family. (p. 138) It is, she argues, ‘the actual physical division of labor by gender itself, and the consequent physical/social relations of the infant to its environment which constitute the material base’ (p. 149). For Harding, an adequate account of this production of persons requires a ‘psychological’ theory such as that of Nancy Chodorow or of Jane Flax (p. 150).

^{vi} It should be noted that there is another, different, concept of ‘maternal labour’ in economics and some sociology, where ‘maternal labour’ refers to mothers who undertake waged work (and where ‘domestic labour’ means a type of labour – childminding, for example – undertaken for money). In these contexts ‘maternal labour supply’ is the supply of labour by women who happen to be mothers, just as ‘child labour’ or ‘slave labour’ is the supply of labour by children or slaves. In each case the form of labour is quite indifferent to the one labouring. See, for example, Samuel Berlinski, Sebastian Galiani, Patrick J. McEwan, ‘Preschool and Maternal Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design’, Institute for Fiscal Studies (2008) <<http://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp0905.pdf>> [accessed September 2011].

^{vii} Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (Middlesex: Penguin/London: New Left Review, 1973), p. 104.

^{viii} *Ibid.*, p. 104–5.

^{ix} *Ibid.*, p. 105.

^x *Ibid.*, p. 85. See also p. 87: ‘All production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual within and through a specific form of society.’ Thus even the specification of the ‘common element’ includes its historical specificity.

^{xi} *Ibid.*, p. 99.

^{xii} Heidi Hartmann (‘The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism’, in Sargent, ed., *Women and Revolution*, p. 13) quotes Eli Zaretsky’s description of Shulamith Firestone’s *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution* as ‘a plea for subjectivity’ as illustrative of this tendency. How different Firestone seems 40 years later: see Mandy Merck and Stella Sandford, eds., *Further Adventures of the Dialectic of Sex: Critical Essays on Shulamith Firestone*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

^{xiii} Quoted in Lise Vogel, 'Marxism and Feminism: The Unhappy Marriage, Trial Separation or Something Else?', in Sargent, ed., *Women and Revolution*, p. 201. Vogel quotes from Margaret Benston, 'The Political Economy of Women's Liberation', *Monthly Review*, 21, No. 4 (September 1969), pp. 13–27.

^{xiv} See Vogel, 'Marxism and Feminism', p. 201. Vogel refers to Peggy Morton's 'A Woman's Work is Never Done, or: The Production, Maintenance and Reproduction of Labor Power', in Edith Altbach, ed., *From Feminism to Liberation*, (Cambridge MA: Schenkman, 1971). See also Eli Zaretsky, *Capitalism, the Family, and Personal Life* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).

^{xv} Hartmann, 'The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism', pp. 15, 18.

^{xvi} *Ibid.*, p. 29.

^{xvii} Young, 'Beyond the Unhappy Marriage', p. 58. See also p. 61.

^{xviii} *Ibid.*, p. 52.

^{xix} I purposefully refer here to child *rearing* and not child *bearing*. As Sara Ruddick pointed out (*Maternal Thinking*, p. 48), 'child bearing' is a relatively minor part of what she called 'mothering' or 'maternal work', and many mothers will not have done it at all. In Baraitser's *Maternal Encounters* pregnancy and birth are similarly not essential to mothering. (The inevitable corollary of this – welcomed by both Ruddick and Baraitser – is that it is not exclusively women who can be mothers.) Of course, historically, child bearing – or more specifically child birthing – has been the one aspect of maternal work that *has* been given the name 'labour', but I think reflection on that (for example in Mary O'Brien's *The Politics of Reproduction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981) has tended to privilege pregnancy and birth at the expense of all other aspects of maternal labour.

^{xx} This is implicitly recognised in Dino Giovannini's 'Are Father's Changing? Comparing Some Different Images on Sharing of Childcare and Domestic Work' (in Eileen Drew, Ruth Emerek and Evelyn Mahon, eds., *Women, Work and the Family in Europe*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), in the category of the 'the delegating father': 'a father who delegates to his partner all the tasks regarding both family organisation and children's care and upbringing.' (p. 196) From a different perspective it is also implicit in Ruddick's claim that the distinction between 'birthing labor' and 'mothering' means that 'all mothers are "adoptive"'. To adopt is to commit oneself to protecting, nurturing, and training particular children. Even the most passionately loving birthgiver engages in a social, adoptive act when she commits herself to sustain an infant in the world.' Of course, not all birthgivers will do this.

^{xxi} Susan Himmelweit and Simon Mohun were explicit in their claims that the only correct analysis of domestic labour was an analysis 'from the standpoint of capital'. From this standpoint they were able to define domestic labour as 'the biological production of human beings, their care, maintenance and continued socialisation as living labourers on a daily as well as a generational basis. The ultimate purpose of this production is to provide labour-power for sale as a commodity to capital in order that surplus value be produced.' Himmelweit and Mohun, 'Domestic Labour and Capital', *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 1, 1977, pp. 22, 28.

^{xxii} It is notable that even Harding, who emphasises the specificity of the 'products' (i.e. adult social persons) of the family views the labour of social reproduction only from the standpoint of capital: 'The family is the location of the processes whereby it is insured that this generation's interests in class, gender, race and obligatory heterosexuality will be inherited by the next generation.' Harding, 'What is the Real Material Base of Patriarchy and Capital?', p. 156,. See also p. 145. This is partly the result of the tendency, identified by Baraitser (see, for example, *Maternal Encounters*, pp. 29–33), to think of mother-child relations exclusively in terms of the production of the new person (to use Harding's terminology), not the production of the maternal subject.

^{xxiii} Ann Ferguson and Nancy Folbre, 'The Unhappy Marriage of Patriarchy and Capitalism', in Sargent, ed., *Women and Revolution*, p. 314.

^{xxiv} *Ibid.*, p. 318.

^{xxv} Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 290.

^{xxvi} *Ibid.*, p. 293.

^{xxvii} 'Biopower names these productive capacities of life that are equally intellectual and corporeal.' *Ibid.*, p. 364.

^{xxviii} *Ibid.*, p. 364.

^{xxix} Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 133.

^{xxx} *Ibid.*, p. 134.

^{xxxi} Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 292–3.

^{xxxii} Although of course this is not entirely new: sexual affective labour, which is immaterial in Hardt and Negri's sense, was introduced to the cash nexus quite some time ago.

^{xxxiii} Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking*, p. 133.